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Position Paper for
Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly
Symposium on Gay Marriage
by THERESE M. STEWART'
Preface
1. The topic of interjurisdictional recognition of gay and lesbian
marriages that are legal in the place where entered into is of great
interest and has begun to surface in a number of cases around the
country. It is not at issue in the cases pending in the San Francisco
Superior Court, although one of the coordinated cases may eventually
raise it. It is in issue in another case in California, pending in the U.S.
District Court for the Central District called Smelt v. Orange County
and United States of America, No. SACV04-1042 GLT (C.D. Cal.
filed Sept. 24, 2004). Smelt involves, among other things, a challenge
to the federal Defense of Marriage Act ("DOMA"), which
establishes federal policy of non-recognition of the marriages of
same-sex couples, regardless of where entered into and whether valid
where entered. The City has submitted an amicus brief in Smelt
arguing that the federal court should abstain from deciding the
federal constitutional challenges to California's marriage statutes
since the state court may, if it strikes down those laws under the state
constitution, avoid the need for a decision under the federal
constitution. The City has not weighed in on interjurisdictional
recognition issues to date. An excellent article on the subject is
Professor Herma Hill Kay's Same-Sex Divorce in the Conflict of
Laws, 15 Kings College L. J. 63 (2004).
2. The topic of whether same-sex marriage is a civil rights issue
is one the City has weighed in on. My position paper, which follows,
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will focus on this and the next topic.
3. The topic of whether a constitutional amendment banning
same-sex marriage violates principles of federalism is one on which
the City Attorney has weighed in, albeit not in the context of the
pending litigation, and I will address it in the position paper attached.
4. The issue of separation of powers and local governments'
ability to make decisions on matters of the constitutionality of state
statutes they are charged with implementing is the subject of the
California Supreme Court's ruling in Lockyer v. City and County of
San Francisco, 33 Cal. 4th 1055 (2004). The City Attorney's Office
briefed that issue extensively and argued it in the California Supreme
Court, and we have strong views about it, but since it is a settled issue
now for purposes of California law, I will not focus the position paper
on it. Our California Supreme Court briefs can be obtained from the
California courts' website, www.courtinfo.ca.gov (Supreme Court
Case No. 122923).
Position Paper
I. Marriage is a Fundamental Civil Right, and Depriving a Class of
People That Right Based on Their Gender or Sexual Orientation
Plainly is a Civil Rights Issue.
Both the United States Supreme Court and the California
Supreme Court have, on numerous occasions, held that marriage is a
fundamental civil right. Both courts have also held that the decisions
of whether and whom to marry are a critical aspect of that right.
While the purposes of marriage are many and varied, and are
different for different people, decisions about the issues that have
been viewed as important to the marital relationship have likewise
been recognized as constitutionally protected civil rights, for example,
the decisions whether and with whom to have an intimate sexual
relationship, whether to cohabitate with another person, whether to
have or raise children, whether to use (or not use) contraception,
whether to conceive and/or bear a child, whether to terminate a
pregnancy, and to how to raise and educate one's children.
If the right to marry and all of the rights incident to marriage are
fundamental civil rights, it cannot plausibly be argued that the denial
of these rights to a particular group of people based on gender and/or
sexual orientation is not a civil rights issue. Indeed, denial of any
rights on either of those bases is by itself a civil rights issue-one of
unequal treatment based on criteria that have nothing to do with a
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person's ability to contribute to society. Denial of important rights
that have been held to constitute fundamental civil rights for due
process purposes to a class of persons based on criteria the use of
which raises serious equal protection issues is unquestionably a civil
rights issue. Stated otherwise, the denial of marriage to lesbians and
gay men is a civil rights issue for two reasons: it involves both a denial
of fundamental rights that are protected by the due process clause
and classifications that are or should be suspect. They single out a
group of people based on their sexual orientation and on the gender
of their loved ones for unequal treatment, thus raising equal
protection issues as well.
H. Creating a Federal Constitutional Provision Denying the
Fundamental Right of Marriage to Same-Sex Couples Would
Intrude into an Area of Law and Policy Long Left to the States and
Would Contravene Longstanding Principles of Federalism.
During and since the Reagan years, conservative politicians,
lawyers and judges have been using principles of federalism, i.e., the
notion that states should be free from unwarranted incursions by the
federal government into issues that have traditionally been reserved
to the states, as a means of limiting federal legislation on a variety of
subjects. Of all of the issues for this same group to argue should be
the subject of federal legislation and (currently) a constitutional
amendment, the regulation of marriage is by far the most hypocritical.
That is because marriage has always been regulated at the state level,
and has never, until DOMA (the federal Defense of Marriage Act)
was enacted in 1996), been the subject of federal legislation. The
federal government has, again until DOMA, given the states the right
even for federal law purposes to regulate who could marry. If a
marriage is legal under state law, the federal government historically
has recognized it, whether for purposes of social security, federal
pension benefits, taxation or other federal law purposes.
The federal government has never required uniformity among
the states with respect to marriage law. State marriage laws vary in
minimum age requirements, consent requirements, the requirements
for licensing and solemnization, recognition of common law marriage
and putative spouses, consanguinity limitations, the requirements and
process for divorce, child custody and support laws, and the number
and scope of rights, benefits and obligations that are afforded and
imposed by marriage. The legal history of marriage is one of
unfettered state regulation with only one exception.
Federal intervention in marriage laws has come when only when
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states have restricted the right to marry, and in such circumstances the
Supreme Court has in most instances held that the right is
fundamental and can be denied only in compelling circumstances.
Thus, the Supreme Court has held that states cannot prohibit
marriage between persons of different races, marriage by prisoners or
marriage by persons who have failed to support their children.
Apart from imposing constitutional limitations on denial of the
right to marry, until DOMA the federal government stayed out of the
business of regulating who could marry and what the terms of the
marital relationship would be. That history has reason behind it.
Generally, marriage affects local and state communities much more
than it affects us as a nation. Stable marriages contribute to social
stability, including families whose members provide each other
support. Marriage increases the number of persons who are
supported by employers and even businesses in the form of employee
benefits and family discounts. Marriage reduces homelessness,
joblessness, mental illness, juvenile delinquency and violence.
Marriage reduces the number of people reliant on government
support for health care, mental health care, homeless programs,
welfare and other government benefits and programs, and reduces
the need for law enforcement. The same is true to some extent as
well on a federal level, but the federal government does not bear the
brunt of these costs. Nor does the federal government have the kind
of day to day contact with everyday people that put it in the position
of state and local officials to make sound marriage policies.
For all of these reasons, a federal constitutional amendment
banning marriage between same-sex couples is contrary to core
principles of federalism and should be rejected.
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